Moral Property Rights in Bargaining with Infeasible Claims

Arbeitspapier

In many business transactions, in labor-management relations, in internationalconflicts, and welfare state reforms bargainers hold strong entitlements that are oftengenerated by claims that are not feasible any more. These entitlements seem to considerablyshape negotiation behavior. By using the novel setup of a 'bargaining with claims' experimentwe provide new systematic evidence tracking the influence of entitlements and obligationsthrough the whole bargaining process. We find strong entitlement effects that shape openingoffers, bargaining duration, concessions and reached (dis-)agreements. We argue thatentitlements constitute a 'moral property right' that is influential independent ofnegotiators' legal property rights.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper ; No. 03-055/1

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Relation of Economics to Other Disciplines ; Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement ; Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory ; Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Group Behavior
• Subject: Moral property rights ; fairness judgments ; bargaining with claims ; self-serving bias ; Verhandlungstheorie ; Eigentumsrechtstheorie ; Test ; Theorie ; Soziale Beziehungen

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Gächter, Simon ; Riedl, Arno
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Tinbergen Institute
• (where): Amsterdam and Rotterdam
• (when): 2003

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/85852
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:45 AM CET