Arbeitspapier

Moral Property Rights in Bargaining

In many business transactions, in labor-management relations, in international conflicts, and welfare state reforms claims acquired in the past seem to create strong entitlements that shape current negotiations. Despite their importance, the role of entitlements in negotiations has not received much attention. We fill the gap by designing an experiment that allows us to measure the entitlements and to track them through the whole negotiation process. We find strong entitlement effects that shape opening offers, bargaining duration, concessions and reached (dis-)agreements. We argue that entitlements constitute a moral property right that is influential independent of negotiators' legal property rights.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 697

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Thema
moral property rights
fairness judgements
bargaining with claims
self-serving bias

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Gaechter, Simon
Riedl, Arno
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
(wo)
Munich
(wann)
2002

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
20.09.2024, 08:20 MESZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Gaechter, Simon
  • Riedl, Arno
  • Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)

Entstanden

  • 2002

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