Arbeitspapier
Bargaining in the absence of property rights: An experiment
The Coase theorem posits: If [1] property rights are perfect, [2] contracts are enforceable, [3] preferences are common knowledge, and [4] transaction costs are zero, then the initial alloca-tion of property rights only matters for distribution, not for efficiency. In this paper we claim that condition [1] can be dropped and show experimentally that this is also empirically true. This also holds when we frame taking as "stealing" and when the initial possessor has to work for the good.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: Preprints of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods ; No. 2015/19
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Individual
Microeconomic Behavior: Underlying Principles
Institutions: Design, Formation, Operations, and Impact
Market Design
Allocative Efficiency; Cost-Benefit Analysis
Property Law
- Thema
-
coase theorem
absolute vs. relative right
bargaining
efficiency
distribution
fairness
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Bar-Gill, Oren
Engel, Christoph
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods
- (wo)
-
Bonn
- (wann)
-
2015
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ
Datenpartner
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Bar-Gill, Oren
- Engel, Christoph
- Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods
Entstanden
- 2015