Arbeitspapier

Bargaining in the absence of property rights: An experiment

The Coase theorem posits: If [1] property rights are perfect, [2] contracts are enforceable, [3] preferences are common knowledge, and [4] transaction costs are zero, then the initial alloca-tion of property rights only matters for distribution, not for efficiency. In this paper we claim that condition [1] can be dropped and show experimentally that this is also empirically true. This also holds when we frame taking as "stealing" and when the initial possessor has to work for the good.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: Preprints of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods ; No. 2015/19

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Individual
Microeconomic Behavior: Underlying Principles
Institutions: Design, Formation, Operations, and Impact
Market Design
Allocative Efficiency; Cost-Benefit Analysis
Property Law
Thema
coase theorem
absolute vs. relative right
bargaining
efficiency
distribution
fairness

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Bar-Gill, Oren
Engel, Christoph
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods
(wo)
Bonn
(wann)
2015

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ

Datenpartner

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Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Bar-Gill, Oren
  • Engel, Christoph
  • Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods

Entstanden

  • 2015

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