- Standort
-
Deutsche Nationalbibliothek Frankfurt am Main
- ISBN
-
9783863042608
- Umfang
-
Online-Ressource
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
DICE Discussion Paper ; No 261
- Schlagwort
-
Abgestimmtes Verhalten
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wo)
-
Düsseldorf
- (wer)
-
Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE)
- (wann)
-
2017
- Urheber
- Beteiligte Personen und Organisationen
-
Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economis (DICE), Heinrich-Heine-Universität Düsseldorf, düsseldorf university press (dup)
- URN
-
urn:nbn:de:101:1-2018102916251382740893
- Rechteinformation
-
Der Zugriff auf das Objekt ist unbeschränkt möglich.
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
14.08.2025, 10:50 MESZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
Deutsche Nationalbibliothek. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Deutsche Nationalbibliothek. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Beteiligte
- Reisinger, Markus
- Thomes, Tim Paul
- Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economis (DICE), Heinrich-Heine-Universität Düsseldorf, düsseldorf university press (dup)
- Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE)
Entstanden
- 2017
Ähnliche Objekte (12)
Manufacturer collusion: Strategic implications of the channel structure
Manufacturer collusion and resale price maintenance
Manufacturer’s agency channel encroachment on an online retail platform
How traditional manufacturers succeed in D2D: A strategic framework for assortment and pricing to solve channel conflicts
Stochastic cooperative advertising in a manufacturer-retailer decentralized supply channel
Stochastic cooperative advertising in a manufacturer–retailer decentralized supply channel
Experiments with the traveler's dilemma: Welfare, strategic choice and implicit collusion
Implications of Chinese competitor strategies for German machinery manufacturers
Suspecting Collusion
Detecting collusion
On the stability of research joint ventures: Implications for collusion
On the stability of research joint ventures: implications for collusion
Manufacturer collusion: Strategic implications of the channel structure
Manufacturer collusion and resale price maintenance
Manufacturer’s agency channel encroachment on an online retail platform
How traditional manufacturers succeed in D2D: A strategic framework for assortment and pricing to solve channel conflicts
Stochastic cooperative advertising in a manufacturer-retailer decentralized supply channel
Stochastic cooperative advertising in a manufacturer–retailer decentralized supply channel
Experiments with the traveler's dilemma: Welfare, strategic choice and implicit collusion
Implications of Chinese competitor strategies for German machinery manufacturers
Suspecting Collusion
Detecting collusion
On the stability of research joint ventures: Implications for collusion
On the stability of research joint ventures: implications for collusion
Manufacturer collusion: Strategic implications of the channel structure
Manufacturer collusion and resale price maintenance
Manufacturer’s agency channel encroachment on an online retail platform
How traditional manufacturers succeed in D2D: A strategic framework for assortment and pricing to solve channel conflicts
Stochastic cooperative advertising in a manufacturer-retailer decentralized supply channel
Stochastic cooperative advertising in a manufacturer–retailer decentralized supply channel
Experiments with the traveler's dilemma: Welfare, strategic choice and implicit collusion
Implications of Chinese competitor strategies for German machinery manufacturers
Suspecting Collusion
Detecting collusion
On the stability of research joint ventures: Implications for collusion