Manufacturer collusion and resale price maintenance

Arbeitspapier

We provide a novel theory of harm for resale price maintenance (RPM). In a model with two manufacturers and two retailers, we show that RPM facilitates manufacturer collusion when retailers have alternatives to selling a manufacturer's product. Because of the alternatives, manufacturers can only ensure that retailers sell their products by leaving sufficient retail margins. This restricts the wholesale price level even when the manufacturers collude. RPM allows colluding manufacturers to establish higher prices. The use of renegotiation-proof RPM stabilizes collusion whereas otherwise RPM can decrease the range of discount factors which enable stable collusion.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: Volkswirtschaftliche Diskussionsbeiträge ; No. 197-23

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; Market Structure, Pricing, and Design: Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection ; Antitrust Law ; Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law ; Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices ; Vertical Restraints; Resale Price Maintenance; Quantity Discounts ; Retail and Wholesale Trade; e-Commerce
• Thema: resale price maintenance ; collusion ; retailing

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Hunold, Matthias ; Muthers, Johannes
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): Universität Siegen, Fakultät III, Wirtschaftswissenschaften, Wirtschaftsinformatik und Wirtschaftsrecht
• (wo): Siegen
• (wann): 2023

Weitere Informationen

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/283410
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ