Arbeitspapier
A Hybrid Game with Conditional and Unconditional Veto Power
In the hybrid game, one proposer confronts two responders with veto power: one responder can condition his decisions on his own offer but the other cannot. We vary what the informed responder knows about the offers as well as the uninformed responder's conflict payoff. Neither variation affects behavior: proposers always favor informed responders, who frequently accept minimal offers.
- Language
-
Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
-
Series: Working Paper ; No. 2014:16
- Classification
-
Wirtschaft
Noncooperative Games
Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Group Behavior
- Subject
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Ultimatum
Yes/No game
- Event
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
-
Güth, Werner
Levati, Vittoria
Montinari, Natalia
Nardi, Chiara
- Event
-
Veröffentlichung
- (who)
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Lund University, School of Economics and Management, Department of Economics
- (where)
-
Lund
- (when)
-
2014
- Handle
- Last update
-
10.03.2025, 11:46 AM CET
Data provider
This object is provided by:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Güth, Werner
- Levati, Vittoria
- Montinari, Natalia
- Nardi, Chiara
- Lund University, School of Economics and Management, Department of Economics
Time of origin
- 2014
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