Arbeitspapier
A hybrid game with conditional and unconditional veto power
In the hybrid game, one proposer confronts two responders with veto power: one responder can condition his decisions on his own offer but the other cannot. We vary what the informed responder knows about the offers as well as the uninformed responder´s conflict payoff. Neither variation affects behavior: proposers always favor informed responders, who frequently accept minimal offers.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: Jena Economic Research Papers ; No. 2014-015
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Noncooperative Games
Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Group Behavior
- Thema
-
Ultimatum
Yes/No game
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Güth, Werner
Levati, M. Vittoria
Montinari, Natalia
Nardi, Chiara
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Friedrich Schiller University Jena and Max Planck Institute of Economics
- (wo)
-
Jena
- (wann)
-
2014
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Güth, Werner
- Levati, M. Vittoria
- Montinari, Natalia
- Nardi, Chiara
- Friedrich Schiller University Jena and Max Planck Institute of Economics
Entstanden
- 2014
Ähnliche Objekte (12)
A Hybrid Game with Conditional and Unconditional Veto Power
Experimental game theory
Why do People Veto? An Experimental Analysis of the Valuation and the Consequences of Varying Degrees of Veto Power
Specific institutional aspects of international cooperation: A game theoretic account
The minority of three-game: An experimental and theoretical analysis
Trust in generosity: An experiment of the repeated Yes-No game
Will banks promote trade? Equilibrium selection for the trust game with banks
Alternating or compensating? An experiment on the repeated sequential best shot game
Prior-free optimality and satisficing: a common framework and its experimental implementation
Preisregeln für Auktionen und Ausschreibungen
Sequential versus independent commitment: An indirect evolutionary analysis of bargaining rules
A non-Bayesian approach to (un)bounded rationality
A Hybrid Game with Conditional and Unconditional Veto Power
Experimental game theory
Why do People Veto? An Experimental Analysis of the Valuation and the Consequences of Varying Degrees of Veto Power
Specific institutional aspects of international cooperation: A game theoretic account
The minority of three-game: An experimental and theoretical analysis
Trust in generosity: An experiment of the repeated Yes-No game
Will banks promote trade? Equilibrium selection for the trust game with banks
Alternating or compensating? An experiment on the repeated sequential best shot game
Prior-free optimality and satisficing: a common framework and its experimental implementation
Preisregeln für Auktionen und Ausschreibungen
Sequential versus independent commitment: An indirect evolutionary analysis of bargaining rules
A non-Bayesian approach to (un)bounded rationality
A Hybrid Game with Conditional and Unconditional Veto Power
Experimental game theory
Why do People Veto? An Experimental Analysis of the Valuation and the Consequences of Varying Degrees of Veto Power
Specific institutional aspects of international cooperation: A game theoretic account
The minority of three-game: An experimental and theoretical analysis
Trust in generosity: An experiment of the repeated Yes-No game
Will banks promote trade? Equilibrium selection for the trust game with banks
Alternating or compensating? An experiment on the repeated sequential best shot game
Prior-free optimality and satisficing: a common framework and its experimental implementation
Preisregeln für Auktionen und Ausschreibungen
Sequential versus independent commitment: An indirect evolutionary analysis of bargaining rules