Hochschulschrift
The control complexity of sincere strategy preference based approval voting and of fallback voting, and a study of optimal lobbying and Junta distributions for SAT
- Location
-
Deutsche Nationalbibliothek Frankfurt am Main
- Extent
-
Online-Ressource
- Language
-
Englisch
- Notes
-
Düsseldorf, Univ., Diss., 2009
- Creator
-
Erdélyi, Gábor
- URN
-
urn:nbn:de:hbz:061-20090325-110236-6
- Rights
-
Der Zugriff auf das Objekt ist unbeschränkt möglich.
- Last update
-
14.08.2025, 10:55 AM CEST
Data provider
This object is provided by:
Deutsche Nationalbibliothek. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Deutsche Nationalbibliothek. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Hochschulschrift
Associated
- Erdélyi, Gábor
Other Objects (12)
Voting, lobbying, and the decentralization theorem
Fractional cointegration of voting and non-voting shares
Fractional cointegration of voting and non-voting shares
Fractional Cointegration of Voting and Non-Voting Shares
Power, voting, and voting power
Strictly sincere best responses under approval voting and arbitrary preferences
Uncovered power : external agenda setting, sophisticated voting, and transnational lobbying
Voting paradoxes and group coherence : the condorcet efficiency of voting rules
Two kinds of voting procedures manipulability: Strategic voting and strategic nomination
Voting and Popularity
Voting and Popularity
Bargaining and voting
Voting, lobbying, and the decentralization theorem
Fractional cointegration of voting and non-voting shares
Fractional cointegration of voting and non-voting shares
Fractional Cointegration of Voting and Non-Voting Shares
Power, voting, and voting power
Strictly sincere best responses under approval voting and arbitrary preferences
Uncovered power : external agenda setting, sophisticated voting, and transnational lobbying
Voting paradoxes and group coherence : the condorcet efficiency of voting rules
Two kinds of voting procedures manipulability: Strategic voting and strategic nomination
Voting and Popularity
Voting and Popularity
Bargaining and voting
Voting, lobbying, and the decentralization theorem
Fractional cointegration of voting and non-voting shares
Fractional cointegration of voting and non-voting shares
Fractional Cointegration of Voting and Non-Voting Shares
Power, voting, and voting power
Strictly sincere best responses under approval voting and arbitrary preferences
Uncovered power : external agenda setting, sophisticated voting, and transnational lobbying
Voting paradoxes and group coherence : the condorcet efficiency of voting rules
Two kinds of voting procedures manipulability: Strategic voting and strategic nomination
Voting and Popularity
Voting and Popularity