Preventive wars

Arbeitspapier

The rise of a new power may lead the dominant power to seek a preventive war. We study this scenario in an experimental two-stage bargaining game. In each stage, the rising power makes a bargaining offer and the declining power must choose whether to accept it or fight. Between the two stages, the winning probability shifts towards the rising power. We find fewer preventive wars when the power shift is smaller and when the rising state has the commitment power. Communication and repeated interaction decrease the likelihood of preventive wars. High fighting costs almost eliminate such wars when the rising power's first-stage offer is sufficiently large.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: CeDEx Discussion Paper Series ; No. 2022-01

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; Noncooperative Games ; Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Individual ; International Conflicts; Negotiations; Sanctions ; Economic History: Government, War, Law, International Relations, and Regulation: General, International, or Comparative
• Thema: power shift ; commitment ; bargaining ; conflict ; communication

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Abbink, Klaus ; Dong, Lu ; Huang, Lingbo
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): The University of Nottingham, Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics (CeDEx)
• (wo): Nottingham
• (wann): 2022

Weitere Informationen

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/261239
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ