Arbeitspapier

The Funds Concentration Effect and Discriminatory Bailout

In the presence of macroeconomic shocks severe enough to threaten the liquidity or solvency of the banking system, the regulator can rely on the funds concentration effect to save long-term investment projects. Some banks are forced into bankruptcy with the result that other banks obtain more new funds and remain solvent. We investigate two different implementations of the funds concentration effect and the corresponding discriminatory bailout scheme: “random bailout“ and “bailout the big ones“. While the latter can be problematic in terms of stability, it is superior to the former in terms of welfare and credibility.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 591

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Thema
financial intermediation
macroeconomic risk
banking regulation
discriminatory bailout
funds concentration
aggregate liquidity
consistent expectations

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Erlenmaier, Ulrich
Gersbach, Hans
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
(wo)
Munich
(wann)
2001

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Erlenmaier, Ulrich
  • Gersbach, Hans
  • Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)

Entstanden

  • 2001

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