Arbeitspapier
Equilibrium Selection with Risk Dominance in a Multiple-unit Unit Price Auction
This paper uses an adapted version of the linear tracing procedure, suggested by Harsanyi and Selten (1988), in order to discriminate between two types of multiple Nash equilibria. Equilibria of the same type are pay-off equivalent in the analysed multiple-unit unit price auction where two sellers compete in order to serve a fixed demand. The equilibria where the firm with the larger capacity bids the maximum price, serves the residual demand and is undercut by the low capacity firm that sells its total capacity risk dominate the equilibria where the roles are interchanged.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: Working paper ; No. 2-2008
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
General Financial Markets: General (includes Measurement and Data)
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Boom, Anette
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Copenhagen Business School (CBS), Department of Economics
- (wo)
-
Frederiksberg
- (wann)
-
2008
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Boom, Anette
- Copenhagen Business School (CBS), Department of Economics
Entstanden
- 2008
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