Arbeitspapier
Low price equilibrium in multi-unit auctions: The GSM spectrum auction in Germany
The second-generation GSM spectrum auction in Germany is probably the most clear cut example of a low price outcome in a simultaneous ascending-bid auction. The present paper gives an account of the events, describes the auction rules and market conditions, and provides a theoretical explanation of low price equilibria in simultaneous, ascending-bid auctions. In particular it is shown that the low price equilibrium that implements the efficient allocation is the unique perfect equilibrium of that game.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: SFB 373 Discussion Paper ; No. 2001,31
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Auctions
Rationing; Licensing
- Thema
-
multi-unit auctions
spectrum auctions
telecommunications
industrial organization
game theory
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Grimm, Veronika
Riedel, Frank
Wolfstetter, Elmar
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Humboldt University of Berlin, Interdisciplinary Research Project 373: Quantification and Simulation of Economic Processes
- (wo)
-
Berlin
- (wann)
-
2001
- Handle
- URN
-
urn:nbn:de:kobv:11-10049639
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:41 MEZ
Datenpartner
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Grimm, Veronika
- Riedel, Frank
- Wolfstetter, Elmar
- Humboldt University of Berlin, Interdisciplinary Research Project 373: Quantification and Simulation of Economic Processes
Entstanden
- 2001