Bid Regulations in a Multi-unit Uniform Price Auction

Arbeitspapier

This paper examines the effect of bid regulations on the range of potential equilibrium prices in a multi-unit uniform price auction with heterogenous bidders. General bid caps destroy equilibria with prices above the bid cap and create new equilibria with prices way below the cap. A cap only for larger firms does not guarantee market prices below that cap. A sufficiently high bid floor only for smaller firms destroys some or all pure strategy equilibria despite their prices being above the bid floor. With a general bid floor this happens only with considerably higher bid floors.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: Working paper ; No. 1-2016

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; Market Structure, Pricing, and Design: Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection ; Auctions ; Monopoly; Monopolization Strategies ; Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets ; Economics of Regulation
• Thema: Multi-unit Auctions ; Heterogenous Bidders ; Bid Regulation

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Boom, Anette
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): Copenhagen Business School (CBS), Department of Economics
• (wo): Frederiksberg
• (wann): 2016

Weitere Informationen

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/208580
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 05.04.3025, 20:56 MESZ