Bid Regulations in a Multi-unit Uniform Price Auction

Arbeitspapier

This paper examines the effect of bid regulations on the range of potential equilibrium prices in a multi-unit uniform price auction with heterogenous bidders. General bid caps destroy equilibria with prices above the bid cap and create new equilibria with prices way below the cap. A cap only for larger firms does not guarantee market prices below that cap. A sufficiently high bid floor only for smaller firms destroys some or all pure strategy equilibria despite their prices being above the bid floor. With a general bid floor this happens only with considerably higher bid floors.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: Working paper ; No. 1-2016

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Market Structure, Pricing, and Design: Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection ; Auctions ; Monopoly; Monopolization Strategies ; Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets ; Economics of Regulation
• Subject: Multi-unit Auctions ; Heterogenous Bidders ; Bid Regulation

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Boom, Anette
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Copenhagen Business School (CBS), Department of Economics
• (where): Frederiksberg
• (when): 2016

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/208580
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:44 AM CET