Konferenzbeitrag
Price Regulations in a Multi-unit Uniform Price Auction
Inspired by recent regulations in the New York ICAP market, this paper examines the effect of price regulations on a multi-unit uniform price auction. General bid caps reduce the maximum price below the bid cap, but also the minimum potential market price below the cap. A bid cap only for the larger firms does not guarantee a market price below the cap. A sufficiently high bid floor only for relatively small firms destroys some or all pure strategy equilibria with equilibrium prices above the marginal costs. With a general bid floor this happens only with considerably larger bid floors.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: Beiträge zur Jahrestagung des Vereins für Socialpolitik 2015: Ökonomische Entwicklung - Theorie und Politik - Session: Procurement ; No. F14-V2
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Auctions
Market Structure, Pricing, and Design: Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Boom, Anette
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wann)
-
2015
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:45 MEZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Konferenzbeitrag
Beteiligte
- Boom, Anette
Entstanden
- 2015
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