Price Regulations in a Multi-unit Uniform Price Auction

Konferenzbeitrag

Inspired by recent regulations in the New York ICAP market, this paper examines the effect of price regulations on a multi-unit uniform price auction. General bid caps reduce the maximum price below the bid cap, but also the minimum potential market price below the cap. A bid cap only for the larger firms does not guarantee a market price below the cap. A sufficiently high bid floor only for relatively small firms destroys some or all pure strategy equilibria with equilibrium prices above the marginal costs. With a general bid floor this happens only with considerably larger bid floors.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: Beiträge zur Jahrestagung des Vereins für Socialpolitik 2015: Ökonomische Entwicklung - Theorie und Politik - Session: Procurement ; No. F14-V2

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Auctions ; Market Structure, Pricing, and Design: Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection ; Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Boom, Anette
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (when): 2015

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/112998
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:45 AM CET