Arbeitspapier
A sealed-bid auction that matches the English auction
This paper analyzes a two-stage sealed-bid auction that is frequently employed in privatization, takeover, and merger and acquisition contests. This auction format yields the same expected revenue as the open ascending (English) auction, yet is less susceptible to preemptive bidding and collusion.
- Language
-
Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
-
Series: SFB 373 Discussion Paper ; No. 1998,63
- Classification
-
Wirtschaft
Auctions
- Subject
-
Auctions
- Event
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
-
Perry, Motty
Wolfstetter, Elmar
Zamir, Shmuel
- Event
-
Veröffentlichung
- (who)
-
Humboldt University of Berlin, Interdisciplinary Research Project 373: Quantification and Simulation of Economic Processes
- (where)
-
Berlin
- (when)
-
1998
- Handle
- URN
-
urn:nbn:de:kobv:11-10060032
- Last update
-
10.03.2025, 11:44 AM CET
Data provider
This object is provided by:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Perry, Motty
- Wolfstetter, Elmar
- Zamir, Shmuel
- Humboldt University of Berlin, Interdisciplinary Research Project 373: Quantification and Simulation of Economic Processes
Time of origin
- 1998
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Unique bid auction games
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Revenue implications of choosing discrete bid levels in a Japanese–English auction
The Value of Information in a Sealed-Bid Auction
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Equilibria in a Japanese-English auction with discrete bid levels for the wallet game
The Nature of Equilibria in the Buyer's Bid Double Auction
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