The Unique-lowest Sealed-bid Auction

Arbeitspapier

Unique-lowest sealed-bid auctions are auctions in which participation is endogenous and the winning bid is the lowest bid among all unique bids. Such auctions admit very many Nash equilibria (NEs) in pure and mixed strategies. The two-bidders' auction is similar to the Hawk-Dove game, which motivates to study symmetric NEs: Properties and comparative statics are derived and the symmetric NE with the lowest expected gains is the maximin in symmetric strategies, which allows computation through a mathematical program. Simulations provide numerical evidence that the symmetric NE with the lowest expected gains is the unique limit point of the replicator dynamics.

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• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper ; No. 08-049/1

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Auctions ; Noncooperative Games ; Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games; Repeated Games ; Optimization Techniques; Programming Models; Dynamic Analysis ; Sports; Gambling; Restaurants; Recreation; Tourism
• Subject: Auctions ; Sealed-Bid Auction ; Evolutionary Stability ; Endogenous Entry ; Maximin ; Auktionstheorie ; Glücksspiel ; Nichtkooperatives Spiel ; Evolutionäre Spieltheorie ; Mathematische Optimierung ; Theorie

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Houba, Harold ; van der Laan, Dinard ; Veldhuizen, Dirk
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Tinbergen Institute
• (where): Amsterdam and Rotterdam
• (when): 2008

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/86790