Conditional dominance in games with unawareness

Arbeitspapier

Heifetz, Meier and Schipper (2013) introduced generalized extensive-form games that allow for asymmetric unawareness. Here, we study the normal form of a generalized extensiveform game. The generalized normal-form game associated to a generalized extensive-form game with unawareness may consist of a collection of normal-form games. We use it to characterize extensive-form rationalizability (resp. prudent rationalizability) in generalized extensive-form games by iterative conditional strict (resp. weak) dominance in the associated generalized normal-form. We also show that the analogue to iterated admissibility for generalized normal-form games is not independent of the extensive-form structure. This is because under unawareness, a player's information set not only determines which nodes he considers possible but also of which game tree(s) he is aware of.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: Working Paper ; No. 351

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Noncooperative Games ; Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
• Subject: Awareness ; unknown unknowns ; extensive-form games ; normal-form games ; extensive-form rationalizability ; prudent rationalizability ; iterated conditional dominance ; iterated admissibility

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Meier, Martin ; Schipper, Burkhard
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): University of California, Department of Economics
• (where): Davis, CA
• (when): 2022

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/267015
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:44 AM CET