Artikel

Reciprocity in locating contributions: Experiments on the neighborhood public good game

In repeated public good experiments, reciprocity helps to sustain high levels of cooperation. Can this be achieved by location choices in addition to making contributions? It is more realistic to rely on an intuitive neighborhood model for community members who interact repeatedly. In our experiments, participants can locate their contribution, yielding a small benefit for the participant, who receives the contribution and a small disadvantage for the participant, at the opposite location. This mechanism of individually targeted sanctions helps to foster initial cooperation. It decreases over time, however. Location choices are used to reciprocate, but may not suffice to stabilize voluntary cooperation as an effect observed in the field.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Journal: Games ; ISSN: 2073-4336 ; Volume: 4 ; Year: 2013 ; Issue: 2 ; Pages: 144-162 ; Basel: MDPI

Classification
Wirtschaft
Subject
public good game
neighborhood
cooperation
experimental analysis

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Berninghaus, Siegfried
Güth, Werner
Schosser, Stephan
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
MDPI
(where)
Basel
(when)
2013

DOI
doi:10.3390/g4020144
Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:44 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Artikel

Associated

  • Berninghaus, Siegfried
  • Güth, Werner
  • Schosser, Stephan
  • MDPI

Time of origin

  • 2013

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