Arbeitspapier
Group bargaining and conflict
We consider a situation where groups negotiate over the allocation of a surplus (which is used to fund group specific goods). Each group is composed of agents who have differing valuations for public goods. Members choose a representative to take decisions on their behalf. Specifically, representatives can decide to enter either a (cooperative) negotiation protocol or a conflict to appropriate the surplus. In the cooperative negotiations, disagreement corresponds to a pro rata allocation (as a function of the size of the groups). We analyse the conditions (on the internal composition of the groups) under which conflict will be preferred to negotiated agreements (and vice versa), and we derive welfare implications. Finally, we provide results of comparative statics that highlight the influence of changes in the internal composition of groups and in their relative size on the profitability of negotiated agreements.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: Nota di Lavoro ; No. 2010,125
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions
Dispute Resolution: Strikes, Arbitration, and Mediation; Collective Bargaining
- Thema
-
Bargaining
Conflict
Agency Problem
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Quérou, Nicolas
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM)
- (wo)
-
Milano
- (wann)
-
2010
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ
Datenpartner
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Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Quérou, Nicolas
- Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM)
Entstanden
- 2010
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