Arbeitspapier
Inter-group conflict and intra-group punishment in an experimental contest game
We study how conflict in contest games is influenced by rival parties being groups and by group members being able to punish each other. Our motivation stems from the analysis of socio-political conflict. The theoretical prediction is that conflict expenditures are independent of group size and of whether punishment is available or not. We find, first, that conflict expenditures of groups are substantially larger than those of individuals, and both are above equilibrium. Second, allowing group members to punish each other leads to even larger conflict expenditures. These results contrast with those from public goods experiments where punishment enhances efficiency.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: CeDEx Discussion Paper Series ; No. 2009-03
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Design of Experiments: General
Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions
International Conflicts; Negotiations; Sanctions
Public Goods
- Thema
-
laboratory experiments
rent-seeking, conflict
group competitiveness
Interessengruppentheorie
Konflikt
Kosten
Rent Seeking
Spieltheorie
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Abbink, Klaus
Brandts, Jordi
Herrmann, Benedikt
Orzen, Henrik
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
The University of Nottingham, Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics (CeDEx)
- (wo)
-
Nottingham
- (wann)
-
2009
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ
Datenpartner
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Abbink, Klaus
- Brandts, Jordi
- Herrmann, Benedikt
- Orzen, Henrik
- The University of Nottingham, Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics (CeDEx)
Entstanden
- 2009