Arbeitspapier

Compulsory disclosure of private information: Theoretical and experimental results for the Acquiring-a-Company game

Based on the acquiring-a-company game of Samuelson and Bazerman (1985), we theoretically and experimentally analyze the acquisition of a firm. Thereby we compare cases of symmetrically and asymmetrically informed buyers and sellers. This setting allows us to predict and test the effects of information disclosure as prescribed by two recently implemented directives of the European Union, the Transparency and the Takeover-Bid Directive. Our theoretical and experimental results suggest a welfare-enhancing effect of compulsory information disclosure. Hence, the EU Transparency and the EU Takeover-Bid Directive should both be welfare enhancing.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: Jena Economic Research Papers ; No. 2014-003

Classification
Wirtschaft
Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Individual
Allocative Efficiency; Cost-Benefit Analysis
Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
Subject
acquisition of firms
disclosure of private information
experimental economics

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Güth, Werner
Pull, Kerstin
Stadler, Manfred
Zaby, Alexandra
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Friedrich Schiller University Jena and Max Planck Institute of Economics
(where)
Jena
(when)
2014

Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:42 AM CET

Data provider

This object is provided by:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.

Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Güth, Werner
  • Pull, Kerstin
  • Stadler, Manfred
  • Zaby, Alexandra
  • Friedrich Schiller University Jena and Max Planck Institute of Economics

Time of origin

  • 2014

Other Objects (12)