Internal governance and creditor governance: Evidence from credit default swaps

Arbeitspapier

I study the relation between internal governance and creditor governance. A deterioration in creditor governance may increase the agency costs of debt and managerial opportunism at the expense of shareholders. I exploit the introduction of credit default swaps (CDS) as a negative shock to creditor governance. I provide evidence consistent with shareholders pushing for a substitution effect between internal governance and creditor governance. Following CDS introduction, CDS firms reduce managerial risk-taking incentives relative to other firms. At the same time, after the start of CDS trading, CDS firms increase managerial wealth-performance sensitivity, board independence, and CEO turnover performance-sensitivity relative to other firms.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: IWH Discussion Papers ; No. 6/2017

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill ; Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Voting; Proxy Contests; Corporate Governance
• Thema: creditor governance ; credit default swaps ; empty creditors

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Colonnello, Stefano
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): Leibniz-Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung Halle (IWH)
• (wo): Halle (Saale)
• (wann): 2017

Weitere Informationen

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/150010
• URN: urn:nbn:de:gbv:3:2-68392
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ