Arbeitspapier

Creditor Rights, Country Governance, and Corporate Cash Holdings

This study examines the impact of creditor rights on cash holdings using a sample of firms from 48 countries. We argue that creditor rights affect the willingness of lenders to provide credit, which in turn affects the need for internal liquidity and cash holdings. Consistent with this, we find that corporate cash holdings decline with the strength of creditor rights. We also find that this relation depends on the quality of country governance. Among well-governed countries, firms hold less cash as creditor rights strengthen. In contrast, cash holdings increase with creditor rights in poorly governed countries. In these countries, it appears that the fear of expropriation motivates creditors with stronger rights to require higher levels of cash holding by borrowers.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: Working Paper ; No. 1214

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Voting; Proxy Contests; Corporate Governance
Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill
International Financial Markets
Thema
Corporate governance
Cash levels
Creditor rights
International markets
Corporate Governance
Betriebliche Liquidität
Kreditsicherung
Sachenrecht
Welt

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Seifert, Bruce
Faleye, Olubunmi
Gonenc, Halit
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Koç University-TÜSİAD Economic Research Forum (ERF)
(wo)
Istanbul
(wann)
2012

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Seifert, Bruce
  • Faleye, Olubunmi
  • Gonenc, Halit
  • Koç University-TÜSİAD Economic Research Forum (ERF)

Entstanden

  • 2012

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