Monografie
Can Higher Bonuses Lead to Less Effort? Incentive Reversal in Teams
- Sprache
-
Deutsch
- Identifier
-
1011006162
- Reihe
-
IZA Discussion Papers; 5501
Thema
Arbeitsgruppe; Teamwork; Leistungsmotivation; Leistungslohn; Anreizsystem; Arbeitsleistung; Testen
Beteiligte Personen und Organisationen
- URN
- Rechteinformation
-
Der Zugriff auf das Objekt ist unbeschränkt möglich.
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
26.01.2023, 13:55 MEZ
Objekttyp
- Monografie
Ähnliche Objekte (12)
Team governance: empowerment or hierarchical control
Performance pay, group selection and group performance
The impact of inequity aversion on relational incentive contracts
Can higher bonuses lead to less effort? Incentive reversal in teams
When high-powered incentive contracts reduce performance : Choking under pressure as a screening device
The impact of inequity aversion on relational incentive contracts
Competition, cooperation, and corporate culture
The economic and social determinants of employee behavior: evidence from insider econometric studies
Incentives and Cooperation in Firms: Field Evidence
Mitarbeitermotivation in Start-Ups - Theoretischer Rahmen und praktische Handlungsempfehlungen
Transparency, inequity aversion, and the dynamics of peer pressure in teams : theory and evidence
The Role of Salience in Performance Schemes: Evidence from a Field Experiment
Team governance: empowerment or hierarchical control
Performance pay, group selection and group performance
The impact of inequity aversion on relational incentive contracts
Can higher bonuses lead to less effort? Incentive reversal in teams
When high-powered incentive contracts reduce performance : Choking under pressure as a screening device
The impact of inequity aversion on relational incentive contracts
Competition, cooperation, and corporate culture
The economic and social determinants of employee behavior: evidence from insider econometric studies
Incentives and Cooperation in Firms: Field Evidence
Mitarbeitermotivation in Start-Ups - Theoretischer Rahmen und praktische Handlungsempfehlungen
Transparency, inequity aversion, and the dynamics of peer pressure in teams : theory and evidence
The Role of Salience in Performance Schemes: Evidence from a Field Experiment
Team governance: empowerment or hierarchical control
Performance pay, group selection and group performance
The impact of inequity aversion on relational incentive contracts
Can higher bonuses lead to less effort? Incentive reversal in teams
When high-powered incentive contracts reduce performance : Choking under pressure as a screening device
The impact of inequity aversion on relational incentive contracts
Competition, cooperation, and corporate culture
The economic and social determinants of employee behavior: evidence from insider econometric studies
Incentives and Cooperation in Firms: Field Evidence
Mitarbeitermotivation in Start-Ups - Theoretischer Rahmen und praktische Handlungsempfehlungen
Transparency, inequity aversion, and the dynamics of peer pressure in teams : theory and evidence