Artikel

The incentive impact of the fixed wage: A real effort experiment

According to most simple agency models only the performance dependent part of the compensation drives the agent's effort decision. However, we show that this is not necessarily the case for reference dependent and loss averse agents. Based on Pokorny (2008) we firstly analyze the impact of the fixed wage on work performance within a linear incentive contract when agents are loss averse. Secondly, we test the resulting hypotheses in an economic real effort experiment. Varying the fixed wage but keeping the piece rate constant over treatments, we find a non-monotonic slope of effort in the fixed payment with significantly higher effort levels for a very low fixed wage. Very high fixed payments also yield higher subject performance but to a minor and less robust extent.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Journal: Zeitschrift für Personalforschung (ZfP) ; ISSN: 1862-0000 ; Volume: 27 ; Year: 2013 ; Issue: 4 ; Pages: 331-353 ; Mering: Rainer Hampp Verlag

Klassifikation
Management
Personnel Management; Executives; Executive Compensation
Business Economics
Personnel Economics: Compensation and Compensation Methods and Their Effects
Thema
real effort experiment
incentives
fixed wage
loss aversion

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Manthei, Kathrin
Mohnen, Alwine
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Rainer Hampp Verlag
(wo)
Mering
(wann)
2013

DOI
doi:10.1688/1862-0000_ZfP_2013_04_Manthei
Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ

Datenpartner

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Objekttyp

  • Artikel

Beteiligte

  • Manthei, Kathrin
  • Mohnen, Alwine
  • Rainer Hampp Verlag

Entstanden

  • 2013

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