Konferenzbeitrag
Incentive Design and Mis-Allocated Effort
Incentives often distort behavior: they induce agents to exert effort but this effort is not employed optimally. This paper proposes a theory of incentive design allowing for such distorted behavior. At the heart of the theory is a trade-off between getting the agent to exert effort and ensuring that this effort is used well. The theory covers various moral-hazard models, ranging from traditional single-task to multi-task models. It also provides -for the first time- a formalization and proofs for various widely-spread perceived wisdoms about incentive design and distorted behavior.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: Beiträge zur Jahrestagung des Vereins für Socialpolitik 2013: Wettbewerbspolitik und Regulierung in einer globalen Wirtschaftsordnung - Session: Effort, Incentive, Fairness ; No. D15-V2
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Personnel Economics: Compensation and Compensation Methods and Their Effects
Economics of Contract: Theory
Compensation Packages; Payment Methods
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Schnedler, Wendelin
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften, Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft
- (wo)
-
Kiel und Hamburg
- (wann)
-
2013
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
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ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Konferenzbeitrag
Beteiligte
- Schnedler, Wendelin
- ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften, Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft
Entstanden
- 2013
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