Incentive Design and Mis-Allocated Effort

Konferenzbeitrag

Incentives often distort behavior: they induce agents to exert effort but this effort is not employed optimally. This paper proposes a theory of incentive design allowing for such distorted behavior. At the heart of the theory is a trade-off between getting the agent to exert effort and ensuring that this effort is used well. The theory covers various moral-hazard models, ranging from traditional single-task to multi-task models. It also provides -for the first time- a formalization and proofs for various widely-spread perceived wisdoms about incentive design and distorted behavior.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: Beiträge zur Jahrestagung des Vereins für Socialpolitik 2013: Wettbewerbspolitik und Regulierung in einer globalen Wirtschaftsordnung - Session: Effort, Incentive, Fairness ; No. D15-V2

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Personnel Economics: Compensation and Compensation Methods and Their Effects ; Economics of Contract: Theory ; Compensation Packages; Payment Methods

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Schnedler, Wendelin
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften, Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft
• (where): Kiel und Hamburg
• (when): 2013

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/79775
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:43 AM CET