An Incentive Theory of Matching

Konferenzbeitrag

This paper examines the labour market matching process by distinguishing its two component stages: the contact stage, in which job searchers make contact with employers and the selection stage, in which they decide whether to match. We construct a theoretical model explaining two-sided selection through microeconomic incentives. Firms face adjustment costs in responding to heterogeneous variations in the characteristics of workers and jobs. Matches and separations are described through firms' job offer and firing decisions and workers' job acceptance and quit decisions. Our calibrated model for the U.S. can account for important empirical regularities that the conventional matching model cannot.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: Beiträge zur Jahrestagung des Vereins für Socialpolitik 2010: Ökonomie der Familie - Session: Understanding the Dynamics of Labor Markets ; No. D1-V3

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; Employment; Unemployment; Wages; Intergenerational Income Distribution; Aggregate Human Capital; Aggregate Labor Productivity ; Business Fluctuations; Cycles ; Unemployment: Models, Duration, Incidence, and Job Search
• Thema: Matching ; incentives ; adjustment costs ; unemployment ; employment ; quits ; firing ; job offers ; job acceptance

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Brown, Alessio J. G. ; Merkl, Christian ; Snower, Dennis J.
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): Verein für Socialpolitik
• (wo): Frankfurt a. M.
• (wann): 2010

Weitere Informationen

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/37391
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 20.09.2024, 08:24 MESZ