More Effort with Less Pay: On Information Avoidance, Belief Design, and Performance

Konferenzbeitrag

In a tedious real effort task, subjects know that their piece rate is either low or ten times higher. When subjects are informed about their piece rate realization, they adapt their performance. One third of subjects nevertheless forego this instrumental information when given the choice - and perform stunningly well. Agents who are uninformed regarding their piece rate tend to outperform all others, even those who know that their piece rate is high. This also holds for enforced instead of self-selected information avoidance. All our findings can be captured by a model of optimally distorted expectations following Brunnermeier and Parker (2005).

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: Beiträge zur Jahrestagung des Vereins für Socialpolitik 2016: Demographischer Wandel - Session: Behavioral Economics ; No. E04-V3

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness ; Expectations; Speculations ; Wage Level and Structure; Wage Differentials

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Szech, Nora ; Huck, Steffen ; Wenner, Lukas
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften, Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft
• (wo): Kiel und Hamburg
• (wann): 2016

Weitere Informationen

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/145644
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:45 MEZ