SAT-based Formal Verification of Fault Injection Countermeasures for Cryptographic Circuits
Abstract: Fault injection attacks represent a type of active, physical attack against cryptographic circuits. Various countermeasures have been proposed to thwart such attacks, however, the design and implementation of which are intricate, error-prone, and laborious. The current formal fault-resistance verification approaches are limited in efficiency and scalability. In this paper, we formalize the fault-resistance verification problem and show that it is coNP-complete. We then devise a novel approach for encoding the fault-resistance verification problem as the Boolean satisfiability (SAT) problem so that modern off-the-shelf SAT solvers can be utilized. The approach is implemented in an open-source tool FIRMER which is evaluated extensively on realistic cryptographic circuit benchmarks. The experimental results show that FIRMER is able to verify fault-resistance of almost all (72/76) benchmarks in 3 minutes (the other three are verified in 35 minutes and the hardest one is verified in 4 h.... https://tches.iacr.org/index.php/TCHES/article/view/11782
- Location
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Deutsche Nationalbibliothek Frankfurt am Main
- Extent
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Online-Ressource
- Language
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Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
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SAT-based Formal Verification of Fault Injection Countermeasures for Cryptographic Circuits ; volume:2024 ; number:4 ; year:2024
IACR transactions on cryptographic hardware and embedded systems ; 2024, Heft 4 (2024)
- Creator
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Tan, Huiyu
Gao, Pengfei
Song, Fu
Chen, Taolue
Wu, Zhilin
- DOI
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10.46586/tches.v2024.i4.1-39
- URN
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urn:nbn:de:101:1-2409251857450.860353337951
- Rights
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Open Access; Der Zugriff auf das Objekt ist unbeschränkt möglich.
- Last update
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15.08.2025, 7:19 AM CEST
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Associated
- Tan, Huiyu
- Gao, Pengfei
- Song, Fu
- Chen, Taolue
- Wu, Zhilin
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