Arbeitspapier

Privately contributing to public goods over time: An experimental study

Similar to Levati and Neugebauer (2001), a clock is used by which participants can vary their individual contributions for voluntarily providing a public good. As time goes by, participants either in(de)crease their contribution gradually or keep it constant. Groups of two poorly and two richly endowed participants encounter repeatedly the weakest link-, the usual average contribution- and the best shot-technology of public good provision in a within subject-design. Some striking findings are that the weakest link-technology fares much better than the other two technologies in terms of welfare, and that the willingness to voluntarily contribute is greatly affected by the (increasing or decreasing) clock mechanism.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: SFB 373 Discussion Paper ; No. 2002,18

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Noncooperative Games
Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Group Behavior
Public Goods
Auctions
Thema
Public goods
Voluntary contributions
Efficient provision
Clock mechanism

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Güth, Werner
Levati, Maria Vittoria
Stiehler, Andreas
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Humboldt University of Berlin, Interdisciplinary Research Project 373: Quantification and Simulation of Economic Processes
(wo)
Berlin
(wann)
2002

Handle
URN
urn:nbn:de:kobv:11-10048761
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Güth, Werner
  • Levati, Maria Vittoria
  • Stiehler, Andreas
  • Humboldt University of Berlin, Interdisciplinary Research Project 373: Quantification and Simulation of Economic Processes

Entstanden

  • 2002

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