Arbeitspapier
Privately contributing to public goods over time: An experimental study
Similar to Levati and Neugebauer (2001), a clock is used by which participants can vary their individual contributions for voluntarily providing a public good. As time goes by, participants either in(de)crease their contribution gradually or keep it constant. Groups of two poorly and two richly endowed participants encounter repeatedly the weakest link-, the usual average contribution- and the best shot-technology of public good provision in a within subject-design. Some striking findings are that the weakest link-technology fares much better than the other two technologies in terms of welfare, and that the willingness to voluntarily contribute is greatly affected by the (increasing or decreasing) clock mechanism.
- Sprache
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Englisch
- Erschienen in
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Series: SFB 373 Discussion Paper ; No. 2002,18
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Noncooperative Games
Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Group Behavior
Public Goods
Auctions
- Thema
-
Public goods
Voluntary contributions
Efficient provision
Clock mechanism
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Güth, Werner
Levati, Maria Vittoria
Stiehler, Andreas
- Ereignis
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Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
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Humboldt University of Berlin, Interdisciplinary Research Project 373: Quantification and Simulation of Economic Processes
- (wo)
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Berlin
- (wann)
-
2002
- Handle
- URN
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urn:nbn:de:kobv:11-10048761
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ
Datenpartner
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Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Güth, Werner
- Levati, Maria Vittoria
- Stiehler, Andreas
- Humboldt University of Berlin, Interdisciplinary Research Project 373: Quantification and Simulation of Economic Processes
Entstanden
- 2002