Arbeitspapier
Privately contributing to public goods over time: An experimental study
Similar to Levati and Neugebauer (2001), a clock is used by which participants can vary their individual contributions for voluntarily providing a public good. As time goes by, participants either in(de)crease their contribution gradually or keep it constant. Groups of two poorly and two richly endowed participants encounter repeatedly the weakest link-, the usual average contribution- and the best shot-technology of public good provision in a within subject-design. Some striking findings are that the weakest link-technology fares much better than the other two technologies in terms of welfare, and that the willingness to voluntarily contribute is greatly affected by the (increasing or decreasing) clock mechanism.
- Language
-
Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
-
Series: SFB 373 Discussion Paper ; No. 2002,18
- Classification
-
Wirtschaft
Noncooperative Games
Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Group Behavior
Public Goods
Auctions
- Subject
-
Public goods
Voluntary contributions
Efficient provision
Clock mechanism
- Event
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
-
Güth, Werner
Levati, Maria Vittoria
Stiehler, Andreas
- Event
-
Veröffentlichung
- (who)
-
Humboldt University of Berlin, Interdisciplinary Research Project 373: Quantification and Simulation of Economic Processes
- (where)
-
Berlin
- (when)
-
2002
- Handle
- URN
-
urn:nbn:de:kobv:11-10048761
- Last update
-
10.03.2025, 11:42 AM CET
Data provider
This object is provided by:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Güth, Werner
- Levati, Maria Vittoria
- Stiehler, Andreas
- Humboldt University of Berlin, Interdisciplinary Research Project 373: Quantification and Simulation of Economic Processes
Time of origin
- 2002
Other Objects (12)
Voluntary contributing in a neighborhood public good game: An experimental study
Perfect or Bounded Rationality? : Some Facts, Speculations and Proposals
Experimental game theory
Provision of multilevel public goods through positive externalities: Experimental evidence
Prior-free optimality and satisficing: a common framework and its experimental implementation
The provision of public goods with positive group interdependencies
Preisregeln für Auktionen und Ausschreibungen
Do banks crowd in or out business ethics? An indirect evolutionary analysis
A non-Bayesian approach to (un)bounded rationality
Rules (of bidding) to generate equal stated profits: An axiomatic approach
Collectively ranking candidates: An axiomatic approach
Robust learning experiments: Evidence for learning and deliberation
Voluntary contributing in a neighborhood public good game: An experimental study
Perfect or Bounded Rationality? : Some Facts, Speculations and Proposals
Experimental game theory
Provision of multilevel public goods through positive externalities: Experimental evidence
Prior-free optimality and satisficing: a common framework and its experimental implementation
The provision of public goods with positive group interdependencies
Preisregeln für Auktionen und Ausschreibungen
Do banks crowd in or out business ethics? An indirect evolutionary analysis
A non-Bayesian approach to (un)bounded rationality
Rules (of bidding) to generate equal stated profits: An axiomatic approach
Collectively ranking candidates: An axiomatic approach
Robust learning experiments: Evidence for learning and deliberation
Voluntary contributing in a neighborhood public good game: An experimental study
Perfect or Bounded Rationality? : Some Facts, Speculations and Proposals
Experimental game theory
Provision of multilevel public goods through positive externalities: Experimental evidence
Prior-free optimality and satisficing: a common framework and its experimental implementation
The provision of public goods with positive group interdependencies
Preisregeln für Auktionen und Ausschreibungen
Do banks crowd in or out business ethics? An indirect evolutionary analysis
A non-Bayesian approach to (un)bounded rationality
Rules (of bidding) to generate equal stated profits: An axiomatic approach
Collectively ranking candidates: An axiomatic approach