Arbeitspapier
Competitive Gerrymandering and the Popular Vote
Gerrymandering undermines representative democracy by creating many uncompetitive legislative districts, and generating the very real possibility that a party that wins a clear majority of the popular vote does not win a majority of districts. We present a new approach to the determination of electoral districts, taking a design perspective. Specifically, we develop a redistricting game between two parties who both seek an advantage in upcoming elections, and show that we can achieve two desirable properties: First, the overall election outcome corresponds to the popular vote. Second, most districts are competitive.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 8654
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
Noncooperative Games
- Thema
-
Gerrymandering
legislative elections
redistricting
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Bierbrauer, Felix J.
Polborn, Mattias
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute (CESifo)
- (wo)
-
Munich
- (wann)
-
2020
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ
Datenpartner
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Bierbrauer, Felix J.
- Polborn, Mattias
- Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute (CESifo)
Entstanden
- 2020