Arbeitspapier
Strategy-proof rule in probabilistic allocation problem of an indivisible good and money
We consider the problem of probabilistically allocating a single indivisible good among agents when monetary transfers are allowed. We construct a new strategy-proof rule, called the second price trading rule, and show that it is second best efficient. Furthermore, we give the second price trading rule three characterizations with (1) strategy-proofness, "budget-balance", equal treatment of equals, weak decision-efficiency, and simple generatability, (2) strategy-proofness, "equal rights lower bound", equal treatment of equals, weak decision-efficiency, and simple generatability, (3) strategy-proofness, "envy- freeness, no-trade-no-transfer", equal treatment of equals, weak decision-efficiency, and simple generatability.
- Sprache
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Englisch
- Erschienen in
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Series: ISER Discussion Paper ; No. 931
- Klassifikation
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Wirtschaft
Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation
- Thema
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Strategy-proofness
Probabilistic allocation problem
Second price trading rule
Budget-balance
Second best efficiency
- Ereignis
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Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Hashimoto, Kazuhiko
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
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Osaka University, Institute of Social and Economic Research (ISER)
- (wo)
-
Osaka
- (wann)
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2015
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
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10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ
Datenpartner
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ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Hashimoto, Kazuhiko
- Osaka University, Institute of Social and Economic Research (ISER)
Entstanden
- 2015
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