Incentives and Prosocial Behavior

Arbeitspapier

We build a theory of prosocial behavior that combines heterogeneity in individual altruism and greed with concerns for social reputation or self-respect. The presence of rewards or punishments creates doubt as to the true motive for which good deeds are performed, and this 'overjustification effect' can result in a net crowding out of prosocial behavior by extrinsic incentives. The model also allows us to identify settings that are conducive to multiple social norms of behavior, and those where disclosing one's generosity may backfire. Finally, we analyze the equilibrium contracts offered by sponsors, including the level and confidentiality or publicity of incentives. Sponsor competition may cause rewards to bid down rather than up, and can even reduce social welfare by requiring agents to engage in inefficient sacrifices.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Deutsch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: Discussion Papers in Economics ; No. 230

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design ; Public Goods ; Altruism; Philanthropy; Intergenerational Transfers ; Economic Sociology; Economic Anthropology; Language; Social and Economic Stratification
• Thema: altruism ; rewards ; motivation ; overjustification effect ; crowding out ; identity ; social norms. ; Altruismus ; Leistungsmotivation ; Prestige ; Soziale Norm

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Bénabou, Roland ; Tirole, Jean
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): Princeton University, Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs
• (wo): Princeton, NJ
• (wann): 2004

Weitere Informationen

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/23457
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:45 MEZ