Rent Extraction and Prosocial Behavior

Arbeitspapier

We present controlled experimental evidence on how rent extraction by an administrator affects giving to non-profit associations. Holding the price of giving constant, we compare contributions between two conditions: a rent extraction condition, in which an administrator can expropriate a part of the contributions and a control condition without rent extraction. We find that rent extraction strongly reduces average contributions. Studying the channels through which this effect operates, we demonstrate that rent extraction has situational spillovers, suggesting that it undermines the contributors’ general preference for giving. In contrast, we do not find evidence for negative reciprocity towards the administrator.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 7808

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Institutions: Design, Formation, Operations, and Impact ; Public Goods
• Subject: rent extraction ; donations ; prosocial behavior

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Cagala, Tobias ; Glogowsky, Ulrich ; Grimm, Veronika ; Rincke, Johannes ; Tuset-Cueva, Amanda
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
• (where): Munich
• (when): 2019

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/207199
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:42 AM CET