Arbeitspapier

Rent Extraction and Prosocial Behavior

We present controlled experimental evidence on how rent extraction by an administrator affects giving to non-profit associations. Holding the price of giving constant, we compare contributions between two conditions: a rent extraction condition, in which an administrator can expropriate a part of the contributions and a control condition without rent extraction. We find that rent extraction strongly reduces average contributions. Studying the channels through which this effect operates, we demonstrate that rent extraction has situational spillovers, suggesting that it undermines the contributors’ general preference for giving. In contrast, we do not find evidence for negative reciprocity towards the administrator.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 7808

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Institutions: Design, Formation, Operations, and Impact
Public Goods
Thema
rent extraction
donations
prosocial behavior

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Cagala, Tobias
Glogowsky, Ulrich
Grimm, Veronika
Rincke, Johannes
Tuset-Cueva, Amanda
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
(wo)
Munich
(wann)
2019

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
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Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Cagala, Tobias
  • Glogowsky, Ulrich
  • Grimm, Veronika
  • Rincke, Johannes
  • Tuset-Cueva, Amanda
  • Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)

Entstanden

  • 2019

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