Arbeitspapier

Social image concerns and pro-social behavior

Using longitudinal data on the entire population of blood donors in an Italian town, we examine how donors respond to an award scheme which rewards them with medals when they reach certain donation quotas. Our results indicate that donors significantly increase the frequency of their donations immediately before reaching the thresholds for which the rewards are given, but only if the prizes are publicly announced in the local newspaper and awarded in a public ceremony. The results are robust to several specifications, sample definitions, and controls for observable and unobservable heterogeneity. Our findings are consistent with social image concerns being a primary motivator of pro-social behavior, and indicate that symbolic prizes are most effective as motivators when they are awarded publicly. Because we do not detect a reduction in donation frequency after the quotas are reached, this incentive based on social prestige leads to a net increase in the frequency of donations.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: IZA Discussion Papers ; No. 3771

Classification
Wirtschaft
Consumer Economics: Empirical Analysis
Subject
Incentives
awards
public good provision
pro-social behavior
public health
social prestige
Blutspende
Ökonomischer Anreiz
Prestige
Altruismus
Soziales Verhalten
Italien

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Lacetera, Nicola
Macis, Mario
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)
(where)
Bonn
(when)
2008

Handle
URN
urn:nbn:de:101:1-20081126268
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:42 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Lacetera, Nicola
  • Macis, Mario
  • Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)

Time of origin

  • 2008

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