Arbeitspapier

Moral hazard contracts: does one size fit all?

Incentive theory predicts that contract terms should respond to differences in agents' productivities. Firms' practice of anonymous contracts thus appears puzzling. We show that such a one-size-fits-all approach can be reconciled with standard agency theory if careers are marked by frequent transitions between employers, and agents have career concerns because complete long-term contracts are not feasible.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: IZA Discussion Papers ; No. 2463

Classification
Wirtschaft

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Koch, Alexander K.
Peyrache, Eloïc
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)
(where)
Bonn
(when)
2006

Handle
URN
urn:nbn:de:101:1-2008060610
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:44 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Koch, Alexander K.
  • Peyrache, Eloïc
  • Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)

Time of origin

  • 2006

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