Arbeitspapier
Moral hazard contracts: does one size fit all?
Incentive theory predicts that contract terms should respond to differences in agents' productivities. Firms' practice of anonymous contracts thus appears puzzling. We show that such a one-size-fits-all approach can be reconciled with standard agency theory if careers are marked by frequent transitions between employers, and agents have career concerns because complete long-term contracts are not feasible.
- Language
-
Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
-
Series: IZA Discussion Papers ; No. 2463
- Classification
-
Wirtschaft
- Event
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
-
Koch, Alexander K.
Peyrache, Eloïc
- Event
-
Veröffentlichung
- (who)
-
Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)
- (where)
-
Bonn
- (when)
-
2006
- Handle
- URN
-
urn:nbn:de:101:1-2008060610
- Last update
-
10.03.2025, 11:44 AM CET
Data provider
This object is provided by:
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ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Koch, Alexander K.
- Peyrache, Eloïc
- Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)
Time of origin
- 2006
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