Arbeitspapier
Repeated moral hazard and contracts with memory: A laboratory experiment
This paper reports data from a laboratory experiment on two-period moral hazard problems. The findings corroborate the contract-theoretic insight that even though the periods are technologically unrelated, due to incentive considerations principals can benefit from offering long-term contracts that exhibit memory.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: SFB/TR 15 Discussion Paper ; No. 372
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
Compensation Packages; Payment Methods
- Thema
-
Repeated moral hazard
Sequential hidden actions
Laboratory experiment
Moral Hazard
Vertragsrecht
Zeit
Test
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Nieken, Petra
Schmitz, Patrick W.
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Sonderforschungsbereich/Transregio 15 - Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems (GESY)
- (wo)
-
München
- (wann)
-
2012
- DOI
-
doi:10.5282/ubm/epub.13182
- Handle
- URN
-
urn:nbn:de:bvb:19-epub-13182-0
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
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Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Nieken, Petra
- Schmitz, Patrick W.
- Sonderforschungsbereich/Transregio 15 - Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems (GESY)
Entstanden
- 2012
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