- Standort
-
Deutsche Nationalbibliothek Frankfurt am Main
- Umfang
-
Online-Ressource
- Sprache
-
Deutsch
- Erschienen in
-
IZA Discussion Papers ; 6003
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
- Schlagwort
-
Kündigung
Kosten
Arbeitslosenversicherung
Lohn
Betriebszugehörigkeit
Moral Hazard
Unterbeschäftigung
Theorie
Arbeitsvertrag
Kündigung
Kosten
Arbeitslosenversicherung
Gehalt
Lohn
Betriebszugehörigkeit
Moral Hazard
Kurzarbeit
Unterbeschäftigung
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wo)
-
Bonn
- (wer)
-
Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit GmbH
- (wann)
-
2011
- Urheber
- URN
-
urn:nbn:de:101:1-201110263414
- Rechteinformation
-
Der Zugriff auf das Objekt ist unbeschränkt möglich.
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
15.08.2025, 07:32 MESZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
Deutsche Nationalbibliothek. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Deutsche Nationalbibliothek. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Beteiligte
- Parsons, Donald O.
- Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit GmbH
Entstanden
- 2011
Ähnliche Objekte (12)
Double-sided moral hazard in job displacement insurance contracts
Incentive Contracts in Two-Sided Moral Hazards with Multiple Agents
Insurance Contracts and Securitization
Venture capital, double-sided adverse selection, and double-sided moral hazard
Two-Sided Learning, Labor Turnover and Worker Displacement
Competitive risk sharing contracts with one-sided commitment
Competitive risk sharing contracts with one-sided commitment
Competitive Risk Sharing Contracts with One-Sided Commitment
Competitive risk sharing contracts with one-sided commitment
Job Displacement Insurance: An Overview
Neoclassical growth with long-term one-sided commitment contracts
Risk Contracts with Private Information and One-Sided Commitment
Double-sided moral hazard in job displacement insurance contracts
Incentive Contracts in Two-Sided Moral Hazards with Multiple Agents
Insurance Contracts and Securitization
Venture capital, double-sided adverse selection, and double-sided moral hazard
Two-Sided Learning, Labor Turnover and Worker Displacement
Competitive risk sharing contracts with one-sided commitment
Competitive risk sharing contracts with one-sided commitment
Competitive Risk Sharing Contracts with One-Sided Commitment
Competitive risk sharing contracts with one-sided commitment
Job Displacement Insurance: An Overview
Neoclassical growth with long-term one-sided commitment contracts
Risk Contracts with Private Information and One-Sided Commitment
Double-sided moral hazard in job displacement insurance contracts
Incentive Contracts in Two-Sided Moral Hazards with Multiple Agents
Insurance Contracts and Securitization
Venture capital, double-sided adverse selection, and double-sided moral hazard
Two-Sided Learning, Labor Turnover and Worker Displacement
Competitive risk sharing contracts with one-sided commitment
Competitive risk sharing contracts with one-sided commitment
Competitive Risk Sharing Contracts with One-Sided Commitment
Competitive risk sharing contracts with one-sided commitment
Job Displacement Insurance: An Overview
Neoclassical growth with long-term one-sided commitment contracts