Arbeitspapier
Competition of politicians for wages and office
We examine a model in which two politicians compete for office and for wages. Their remunerations are either set by the public or are offered competitively by the candidates during campaigns. Our main finding shows that competitive wage offers by candidates lead to lower social welfare than remunerations predetermined by the public, since less competent candidates are elected or wage costs are higher.
- Language
-
Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
-
Series: Discussion Paper Series ; No. 399
- Classification
-
Wirtschaft
Analysis of Collective Decision-Making: General
Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty: General
- Subject
-
Competitive wage offers
remunerations of politicians
elections
free riding and under provision
incentive contracts
Politiker
Leistungsentgelt
Leistungsanreiz
Lohn
Ökonomische Theorie der Demokratie
- Event
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
-
Gersbach, Hans
- Event
-
Veröffentlichung
- (who)
-
University of Heidelberg, Department of Economics
- (where)
-
Heidelberg
- (when)
-
2003
- Handle
- Last update
-
10.03.2025, 11:44 AM CET
Data provider
This object is provided by:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Gersbach, Hans
- University of Heidelberg, Department of Economics
Time of origin
- 2003
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