Arbeitspapier

Evolutionary Selection against Iteratively Weakly Dominated Strategies

This paper provides sufficient conditions under which convex monotonic evolutionary dynamics (a class of imitative dynamics that includes the replicator dynamic) select against strategies that do not survive iterated elimination of weakly dominated strategies. We apply these conditions to Bertrand duopolies, first-price auctions, finitely repeated Prisoner's Dilemmas, and the p-Beauty Contests. Our conditions also imply evolutionary selection against all iteratively strictly dominated strategies.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: Working Paper ; No. 2017:18

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Noncooperative Games
Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games; Repeated Games
Thema
Iterated elimination of weakly dominated strategies
Iterated admissibility
Payoff monotonicity
Convex monotonicity
Evolutionary dynamics
Replicator dynamic

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Bernergård, Axel
Mohlin, Erik
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Lund University, School of Economics and Management, Department of Economics
(wo)
Lund
(wann)
2018

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ

Datenpartner

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Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Bernergård, Axel
  • Mohlin, Erik
  • Lund University, School of Economics and Management, Department of Economics

Entstanden

  • 2018

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