Arbeitspapier
Evolutionary Selection against Iteratively Weakly Dominated Strategies
This paper provides sufficient conditions under which convex monotonic evolutionary dynamics (a class of imitative dynamics that includes the replicator dynamic) select against strategies that do not survive iterated elimination of weakly dominated strategies. We apply these conditions to Bertrand duopolies, first-price auctions, finitely repeated Prisoner's Dilemmas, and the p-Beauty Contests. Our conditions also imply evolutionary selection against all iteratively strictly dominated strategies.
- Sprache
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Englisch
- Erschienen in
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Series: Working Paper ; No. 2017:18
- Klassifikation
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Wirtschaft
Noncooperative Games
Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games; Repeated Games
- Thema
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Iterated elimination of weakly dominated strategies
Iterated admissibility
Payoff monotonicity
Convex monotonicity
Evolutionary dynamics
Replicator dynamic
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Bernergård, Axel
Mohlin, Erik
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
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Lund University, School of Economics and Management, Department of Economics
- (wo)
-
Lund
- (wann)
-
2018
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ
Datenpartner
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Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Bernergård, Axel
- Mohlin, Erik
- Lund University, School of Economics and Management, Department of Economics
Entstanden
- 2018