Artikel

Survival of dominated strategies under evolutionary dynamics

We prove that any deterministic evolutionary dynamic satisfying four mild requirements fails to eliminate strictly dominated strategies in some games. We also show that existing elimination results for evolutionary dynamics are not robust to small changes in the specifications of the dynamics. Numerical analysis reveals that dominated strategies can persist at nontrivial frequencies even when the level of domination is not small.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Journal: Theoretical Economics ; ISSN: 1555-7561 ; Volume: 6 ; Year: 2011 ; Issue: 3 ; Pages: 341-377 ; New Haven, CT: The Econometric Society

Classification
Wirtschaft
Noncooperative Games
Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games; Repeated Games
Subject
Evolutionary game theory
evolutionary game dynamics
nonconvergnece
dominated strategies

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Sandholm, William H.
Hofbauer, Josef
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
The Econometric Society
(where)
New Haven, CT
(when)
2011

DOI
doi:10.3982/TE771
Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:42 AM CET

Data provider

This object is provided by:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.

Object type

  • Artikel

Associated

  • Sandholm, William H.
  • Hofbauer, Josef
  • The Econometric Society

Time of origin

  • 2011

Other Objects (12)