Artikel
Survival of dominated strategies under evolutionary dynamics
We prove that any deterministic evolutionary dynamic satisfying four mild requirements fails to eliminate strictly dominated strategies in some games. We also show that existing elimination results for evolutionary dynamics are not robust to small changes in the specifications of the dynamics. Numerical analysis reveals that dominated strategies can persist at nontrivial frequencies even when the level of domination is not small.
- Language
-
Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
-
Journal: Theoretical Economics ; ISSN: 1555-7561 ; Volume: 6 ; Year: 2011 ; Issue: 3 ; Pages: 341-377 ; New Haven, CT: The Econometric Society
- Classification
-
Wirtschaft
Noncooperative Games
Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games; Repeated Games
- Subject
-
Evolutionary game theory
evolutionary game dynamics
nonconvergnece
dominated strategies
- Event
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
-
Sandholm, William H.
Hofbauer, Josef
- Event
-
Veröffentlichung
- (who)
-
The Econometric Society
- (where)
-
New Haven, CT
- (when)
-
2011
- DOI
-
doi:10.3982/TE771
- Handle
- Last update
-
10.03.2025, 11:42 AM CET
Data provider
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Artikel
Associated
- Sandholm, William H.
- Hofbauer, Josef
- The Econometric Society
Time of origin
- 2011