Arbeitspapier

Evolutionary drift and equilibrium selection

This paper develops an approach to equilibrium selection in game theory based on studying the equilibriating process through which equilibrium is achieved. The differential equations derived from models of interactive learning typically have stationary states that are not isolated. Instead, Nash equilibria that specify the same behavior on the equilibrium path, but different out-of-equilibrium behavior, appear in connected components of stationary states. The stability properties of these components often depend critically on the perturbations to which the system is subjected. We argue that it is then important to incorporate such drift into the model. A sufficient condition is provided for drift to create stationary states with strong stability properties near a component of equilibria. This result is used to derive comparative static predictions concerning common questions raised in the literature on refinements of Nash equlibrium.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: Reihe Ökonomie / Economics Series ; No. 26

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Game Theory and Bargaining Theory: General
Noncooperative Games
Thema
evolutionary games
cheap talk
stability drift

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Binmore, Ken
Samuelson, Larry
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Institute for Advanced Studies (IHS)
(wo)
Vienna
(wann)
1996

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ

Datenpartner

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Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Binmore, Ken
  • Samuelson, Larry
  • Institute for Advanced Studies (IHS)

Entstanden

  • 1996

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