Arbeitspapier
Preopening and Equilibrium Selection
We introduce a form of pre-play communication that we call preopening. During the preopening, players announce their tentative actions to be played in the underlying game. Announcements are made using a posting system which is subject to stochastic failures. Posted actions are publicly observable and players payoffs only depend on the opening outcome, i.e. the action profile that is posted at the end of the preopening phase. We show that when the posting failures hit players idiosyncratically all equilibria of the preopening game lead to the same opening outcome that corresponds to the most sensible pure Nash equilibrium of the underlying game. By contrast preopening does not operate an equilibrium selection when posting failure hits players simultaneously.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper ; No. 10-023/2
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Noncooperative Games
Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games; Repeated Games
Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
- Thema
-
Preopening
equilibrium selection
bargaining
cheap talk
Nash-Gleichgewicht
Nichtkooperatives Spiel
Verhandlungstheorie
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Calcagno, Riccardo
Lovo, Stefano
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Tinbergen Institute
- (wo)
-
Amsterdam and Rotterdam
- (wann)
-
2010
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:45 MEZ
Datenpartner
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Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Calcagno, Riccardo
- Lovo, Stefano
- Tinbergen Institute
Entstanden
- 2010
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