Arbeitspapier

Equilibrium Selection in Experimental Cheap Talk Games

In the past, many refinements have been proposed to select equilibria in cheap talk games. Usually, these refinements were motivated by a discussion of how rational agents would reason in some particular cheap talk games. In this paper, we propose a new refinement and stability measure that is intended to predict actual behavior in a wide range of cheap talk games. According to our Average Credible Deviation Criterion (ACDC), the stability of an equilibrium is determined by the frequency and size of credible deviations. ACDC organizes the results from several cheap talk experiments in which behavior converged to equilibrium, even in cases where other criteria do not make a prediction.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper ; No. 15-012/VII

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Noncooperative Games
Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Group Behavior
Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
Thema
Cheap talk
Neologism proofness
Credible deviation
Refinement
ACDC
Experiment

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
de Groot Ruiz, Adrian
Offerman, Theo
Onderstal, Sander
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Tinbergen Institute
(wo)
Amsterdam and Rotterdam
(wann)
2015

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:46 MEZ

Datenpartner

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Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • de Groot Ruiz, Adrian
  • Offerman, Theo
  • Onderstal, Sander
  • Tinbergen Institute

Entstanden

  • 2015

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