Equilibrium Selection in Experimental Cheap Talk Games

Arbeitspapier

In the past, many refinements have been proposed to select equilibria in cheap talk games. Usually, these refinements were motivated by a discussion of how rational agents would reason in some particular cheap talk games. In this paper, we propose a new refinement and stability measure that is intended to predict actual behavior in a wide range of cheap talk games. According to our Average Credible Deviation Criterion (ACDC), the stability of an equilibrium is determined by the frequency and size of credible deviations. ACDC organizes the results from several cheap talk experiments in which behavior converged to equilibrium, even in cases where other criteria do not make a prediction.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper ; No. 15-012/VII

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Noncooperative Games ; Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Group Behavior ; Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design ; Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
• Subject: Cheap talk ; Neologism proofness ; Credible deviation ; Refinement ; ACDC ; Experiment

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): de Groot Ruiz, Adrian ; Offerman, Theo ; Onderstal, Sander
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Tinbergen Institute
• (where): Amsterdam and Rotterdam
• (when): 2015

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/107884
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:46 AM CET