Equilibrium Selection in Cheap Talk Games: ACDC rocks when Other Criteria remain silent

Arbeitspapier

Currently no refinement exists that successfully selects equilibria across a wider range of Cheap Talk games. We propose a generalization of refinements based on credible deviations, such as neologism proofness and announcement proofness. According to our Average Credible Deviation Criterion (ACDC), the stability of an equilibrium is determined by the frequency and the size of credible deviations. In our experiment, we find support for the relevance of credible deviations. In addition, we find support for ACDC in settings where other criteria remain silent. ACDC also explains results from previous experiments.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper ; No. 11-037/1

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; Noncooperative Games ; Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Group Behavior ; Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design ; Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
• Thema: cheap talk ; neologism proofness ; announcement proofness ; credible deviation ; ACDC ; experiment ; Asymmetrische Information ; Dynamisches Spiel ; Nichtkooperatives Spiel ; Theorie

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): de Groot Ruiz, Adrian ; Offerman, Theo ; Onderstal, Sander
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): Tinbergen Institute
• (wo): Amsterdam and Rotterdam
• (wann): 2011

Weitere Informationen

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/86952
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:41 MEZ