Artikel
Pricing and investments in matching markets
Different markets are cleared by different types of prices—seller-specific prices that are uniform across buyers in some markets, and personalized prices tailored to the buyer in others. We examine a setting in which buyers and sellers make investments before matching in a competitive market. We introduce the notion of premuneration values—the values to the transacting agents prior to any transfers— created by a buyer-seller match. Personalized price equilibrium outcomes are independent of premuneration values and exhibit inefficiencies only in the event of “coordination failures,” while uniform-price equilibria depend on premuneration values and in general feature inefficient investments even without coordination failures. There is thus a trade-off between the costs of personalizing prices and the inefficient investments under uniform prices. We characterize the premuneration values under which uniform-price equilibria similarly exhibit inefficiencies only in the event of coordination failures.
- Sprache
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Englisch
- Erschienen in
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Journal: Theoretical Economics ; ISSN: 1555-7561 ; Volume: 8 ; Year: 2013 ; Issue: 2 ; Pages: 535-590 ; New Haven, CT: The Econometric Society
- Klassifikation
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Wirtschaft
Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
Market Structure, Pricing, and Design: General
Market Structure, Pricing, and Design: Perfect Competition
General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium: General
Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
- Thema
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Directed search
matching
premuneration value
prematch investments
search
- Ereignis
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Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
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Mailath, George J.
Samuelson, Larry
Postlewaite, Andrew
- Ereignis
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Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
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The Econometric Society
- (wo)
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New Haven, CT
- (wann)
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2013
- DOI
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doi:10.3982/TE1189
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
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10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ
Datenpartner
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Objekttyp
- Artikel
Beteiligte
- Mailath, George J.
- Samuelson, Larry
- Postlewaite, Andrew
- The Econometric Society
Entstanden
- 2013