Artikel

Pricing and investments in matching markets

Different markets are cleared by different types of prices—seller-specific prices that are uniform across buyers in some markets, and personalized prices tailored to the buyer in others. We examine a setting in which buyers and sellers make investments before matching in a competitive market. We introduce the notion of premuneration values—the values to the transacting agents prior to any transfers— created by a buyer-seller match. Personalized price equilibrium outcomes are independent of premuneration values and exhibit inefficiencies only in the event of “coordination failures,” while uniform-price equilibria depend on premuneration values and in general feature inefficient investments even without coordination failures. There is thus a trade-off between the costs of personalizing prices and the inefficient investments under uniform prices. We characterize the premuneration values under which uniform-price equilibria similarly exhibit inefficiencies only in the event of coordination failures.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Journal: Theoretical Economics ; ISSN: 1555-7561 ; Volume: 8 ; Year: 2013 ; Issue: 2 ; Pages: 535-590 ; New Haven, CT: The Econometric Society

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
Market Structure, Pricing, and Design: General
Market Structure, Pricing, and Design: Perfect Competition
General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium: General
Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
Thema
Directed search
matching
premuneration value
prematch investments
search

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Mailath, George J.
Samuelson, Larry
Postlewaite, Andrew
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
The Econometric Society
(wo)
New Haven, CT
(wann)
2013

DOI
doi:10.3982/TE1189
Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ

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Objekttyp

  • Artikel

Beteiligte

  • Mailath, George J.
  • Samuelson, Larry
  • Postlewaite, Andrew
  • The Econometric Society

Entstanden

  • 2013

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