Payoff equivalence of efficient mechanisms in large matching markets

Artikel

We study Pareto efficient mechanisms in matching markets when the number of agents is large and individual preferences are randomly drawn from a class of distributions, allowing for both common and idiosyncratic shocks. We provide a broad set of circumstances under which, as the market grows large, all Pareto efficient mechanisms - including top trading cycles (with an arbitrary ownership structure), serial dictatorship (with an arbitrary serial order), and their randomized variants - produce a distribution of agent utilities that in the limit coincides with the utilitarian upper bound. This implies that Pareto efficient mechanisms are uniformly asymptotically payoff equivalent "up to the renaming of agents." Hence, when the conditions of our model are met, policy makers need not discriminate among Pareto efficient mechanisms based on the aggregate payoff distribution of participants.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Journal: Theoretical Economics ; ISSN: 1555-7561 ; Volume: 13 ; Year: 2018 ; Issue: 1 ; Pages: 239-271 ; New Haven, CT: The Econometric Society

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; Game Theory and Bargaining Theory: General ; Market Design ; Allocative Efficiency; Cost-Benefit Analysis ; Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
• Thema: Large matching markets ; Pareto efficiency ; payoff equivalence

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Che, Yeon-Koo ; Tercieux, Olivier
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): The Econometric Society
• (wo): New Haven, CT
• (wann): 2018

Weitere Informationen

• DOI: doi:10.3982/TE2793
• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/197146
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ