Hedonic price equilibria, stable matching, and optimal transport: Equivalence, topology, and uniqueness

Arbeitspapier

Hedonic pricing with quasilinear preferences is shown to be equivalent to stable matching with transferable utilities and a participation constraint, and to an optimal transportation (Monge-Kantorovich) linear programming problem. Optimal assignments in the latter correspond to stable matchings, and to hedonic equilibria. These assignments are shown to exist in great generality; their marginal indirect payoffs with respect to agent type are shown to be unique whenever direct payoffs vary smoothly with type. Under a generalized Spence-Mirrlees condition the assignments are shown to be unique and to be pure, meaning the matching is one-to-one outside a negligible set. For smooth problems set on compact, connected type spaces such as the circle, there is a topological obstruction to purity, but we give a weaker condition still guaranteeing uniqueness of the stable match. An appendix resolves an old problem (# 111) of Birkhoff in probability and statistics [5], by giving a necessary and sufficient condition on the support of a joint probability to guarantee extremality among all joint measures with the same marginals.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: cemmap working paper ; No. CWP23/07

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft
• Thema: Hedonischer Preisindex ; Mathematische Optimierung ; Matching ; Operations Research

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Chiappori, Pierre-André ; McCann, Robert J. ; Nesheim, Lars
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): Centre for Microdata Methods and Practice (cemmap)
• (wo): London
• (wann): 2007

Weitere Informationen

• DOI: doi:10.1920/wp.cem.2007.2307
• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/79388
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:45 MEZ